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NOTES
FOREIGN NATIONALS AND AGENCIES

OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AS
PERSONS UNDER THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT: A QUESTION
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1966 the United States Congress passed, and President Johnson signed into law, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).'
Under FOIA any "person" 2 who requests access to records in the
hands of any agency of the executive branch of the United States
government must be provided the requested information unless it
is exempt from disclosure under one of the nine specific exemption
provisions.' Passage of the Act was hailed by the news media,
1.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).

2. The term "person" as defined in the Act includes "an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an
agency." 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1976). The excluded term "agency" refers to an
authority of the United States government and would not include a foreign authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1) (1976).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 specifically provides:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(1)(A) specifically authorized under criteria established by
an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified
pursuant to such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute . . .
provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information
obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an
ageny in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy;
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public interest groups, members of Congress, and the President
himself as a new milestone in open government.4
Since the FOLA was passed, the federal courts have decided over
500 cases interpreting and applying the Act.5 A few of those cases
have interpreted the term "person," as used in the Act, to include
foreign nationals and agencies of foreign governments.' The purpose of this note is to examine the potential for constitutional
conflict implicit in those holdings in light of the President's power
in the area of foreign affairs.
This note will first examine the FOIA as it is juxtaposed against
the President's power in the area of foreign affairs. Particular attention in this area will be directed to the expressed congressional
purpose for passage of the FOLA and the President's role as sole
voice of the nation in international relations. Next, the conflicting
interests will be highlighted by means of a hypothetical fact situation in which the FOIA dictates disclosure of information which
the President feels must be withheld because of foreign policy considerations. Finally, this note will propose some solutions to both
the practical problems presented and the constitutional implications of the conflictm
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes...

;

(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or
condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an
agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial
institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.
4. "I signed this measure with a deep sense of pride that the United States is
an open society in which the people's right to know is cherished and guarded."
Statement of President Johnson upon signing the Freedom of Information Act,
quoted in SUBcOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93RD CONG., 2D

SEsS.,

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

ACT

SOURCEBOOK 1 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as SOURCEBOOK].
5. Saloschin, Newkirk & Gavin, A Short Guide to the Freedom ofInformation
Act 26 (1977), reprintedin U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JusTic FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
CoMM., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION CASE LIST (1978).
6. See, e.g., Stone v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 552 F.2d 132
(5th Cir. 1977); Neal-Cooper Grain Company v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769
(D.D.C. 1974).
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II.

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

A.

HistoricalBackground

The FOIA was the product of ten years of effort by the Subcommittee on Government Information of the House Committee on
Government Operations. 7 In 1955, when Representative John Moss
was appointed chairman of that subcommittee, his letter of appointment contained the following injunction: "An informed public makes the difference between mob rule and democratic government. If the pertinent and necessary information on government
activities is denied the public, the result is a weakening of the
democratic process and the ultimate atrophy of our form of government." 8 The subcommittee's dissatisfaction with public availability of information stemmed from the performance of federal agencies under the record keeping provisions of section 3 of the Administrative Procedures Act That Act, passed in 1946, was originally
intended to give access to government information. Its criteria for
disclosure were so imprecise,'" however, that the agencies governed
by it most frequently used the act as a basis for denying information. The House Report on the bill which eventually became the
FOIA stated: "[T]he law which was designed to provide public
information about Government activities has become the Government's major shield of secrecy."" Because of this perceived secrecy
in government, the Congress undertook to draft legislation that
would provide a method to assure the accessability of government
information to the public.' 2
The legislative history of the FOIA clearly indicates that Congress was concerned with providing access to information for
United States citizens. The record of debates and committee re7. Saloschin, Newkirk & Gavin, supra note 5, at 1,2; See also, H.R. REP. No.
876, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6267,
6269.
8. Letter from Rep. William L. Dawson to Rep. John E. Moss (June 9, 1955),
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6268.
9. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).
10. The Act exempted records if secrecy was required "in the public interest"
or if they related solely to "the internal management of an agency." Documents
could also be withheld "for good cause found," or if the requestor was not a person
"properly and directly concerned." Id.; see also [1966] U.S.

CODE CONG.

NEws 2418, 2421-24.
11. H.R. REP. No. 2429, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2429.
12. Id.

& AD.
CODE
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ports are replete with references to insuring the citizen's rights of
access.' 3 There is no consideration in the legislative history, however, of giving access to foreign nationals. The Comptroller General
of the United States, in his comments on the proposed legislation,
did point out that the Administrative Procedures Act (APA),' 4 to
which the FOIA would be an amendment, included foreign nationals in its definition of "person.'15 There is, however, no indication
that his observation was noted or considered by the Congress. In
its rush to draft a law that would provide the access demanded by
the moment, the word "person," a logical choice, appears to have
been used without regard to how that term was defined in the APA.
B.

The Role of "Persons"

The term "person" is important in the Act in two respects. First,
any "person" is presumptively entitled to access to information., '
Second, exemption (b) (4) protects from disclosure confidential
commerical or financial information which is obtained by the government from a "person."'" These two different uses of the term
in the definition of who may obtain information and whose information is protected from disclosure can lead to an interesting but
anamolous result when foreign entities are included in the meaning
of "person."
A good example of this anamoly is presented by a comparison
of two FOIA cases. The first, Stone v. Export-Import Bank of the
United States,'8 involved an attempt by a candidate for the United
States Senate to obtain specific information concerning the terms
of a loan made by the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) to an
agency of the government of the Soviet Union. Mr. Stone was
unsuccessful in obtaining that information because the court upheld Eximbank's refusal to disclose based on exemption (b)(4). 19
The court reasoned that an agency of the Soviet Union was a
13. 112 CONG. REc. 13007 (1966), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 4, at
46, 53, 54; S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 4, at 36, 45.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
16. Stone v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 552 F.2d 132, 136, at

n.6 (5th Cir. 1977).
16.
17.
18.
19.

5 U.S.C.
5 U.S.C.
552 F.2d
5 U.S.C.

§ 552(a)(3) (1976).
§ 552 (b)(4).
132 (5th Cir. 1977).
§ 552(b)(4).
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person under the Act, 20 and the information submitted to support
its loan application was the type of commercial or financial information protected by the exemption.2 ' Thus, a United States citizen, for whom the Act was intended to procure information, was
unable to determine the soundness of a decision to use the taxpayer's money in a loan to a foreign government. And that government, which runs little risk of competitive harm by disclosure of
its financial arrangements, was protected from scrutiny by United
States citizens.
In stark contrast is the case of Neal-Cooper Grain Company v.
Kissinger,22 involving a reverse FOIA suitn by a United States
corporation to prevent disclosure of information regarding its activities to a foreign government. The Mexican government had
requested, and the United States Customs Service was prepared
to release, information about imports from Mexico which NealCooper was required by United States law to provide to customs
officials.2 4 The court found that the Mexican government was a
"person" within the meaning of the FOIA2 and that the information requested was not confidential.2 6 Although the information
was requested to further an investigation of alleged violations of
Mexican law, the court found there would be no harm to NealCooper in disclosing the documents. 2 Thus, a domestic corporation and a United States citizen,2 for whose benefit the Act was
written, were subjected to possible foreign criminal sanctions resulting from disclosure which was not required by any treaty or
29
executive agreement.
20. 552 F.2d 132, 137.
21. Id. at n.8.
22. 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974).
23. The term "reverse FOIA suit" refers to those actions brought to prevent a
government agency from disclosing information pursuant to a FOIA request. The
information usually concerns the plaintiff who feels it should properly be exempt
from disclosure under the Act. HOUSE COMM. ON GovERNMENT OPERATIONS, A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE ON How TO USE THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT AND THE PRIVACY
Acr IN REQUESTING GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. No. 793, 95th Cong., 1st

Sess. 12 (1977).
24. 385 F. Supp. at 772.
25. Id. at 776.
26. Id. at 777.
27. Id. at 779.
28. The plaintiffs included Albert Louis Hastings, a customs house broker
acting as an agent for Neal-Cooper, who sued on his own behalf. Id. at 771.
29. Id. at 773.

340

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:335

Inclusion of foreign governments in the definition of "person" in
each of these cases leads to a result which appears to be opposite
the expressed congressional purpose behind the FOIA.30 That conflict between purpose and result is not, however, the major problem posed by the definition. As the Neal-Cooper case points out,
the FOIA, as currently interpreted, is a congressional command to
the Executive to disclose any non-exempt information to any person who makes a request for that information, even if the requesting party is a foreign national or an agency of a foreign government.
Therefore, the congressional command must be examined to determine its constitutionality in light of the foreign affairs power of the
President.
Ill.

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

The foreign affairs power of the United States is not specifically
enumerated in the constitution. Specific grants of power to both
the executive and legislative branches touch on various aspects of
international relations31 and support claims of each to preeminence
in the field. In terms of the conduct of foreign relations, however,
the specific grants to the Executive, and the powers inherent in
those grants, have come to be recognized as preeminent.
The first sentence of section one, article II of the constitution
provides that "the executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America. ' 3 From the earliest days of our
constitutional history, some commentators have interpreted this
grant to include all of the executive functions which were typically
exercised by the executive in eighteenth century political systems,
including the conduct of foreign relations." Although Presidents
30.

Id.

31. Executive powers include the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors, and the duty
to insure that the laws are "faithfully executed." Legislative powers include the
power to "declare war," to give "advice and consent" on the making of treaties
and appointments of ambassadors, and the power to make all laws "necessary and
proper for carrying into execution. . . all. . . powers vested by the Constitution
in the Government of the United States."
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
33. Alexander Hamilton, the proponent of executive power for the Washington and Adams administrations, was the first to expound this all encompassing
view of the grant of executive power. In his view, the other enumerated powers of
the President are examples of limitations or modifications to that power which
resulted from grants of power to Congress which intrude to some extent in purely
executive matters. Thus, the President's role as commander-in-chief of the armed
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have frequently relied on the grant of executive power to justify
their activities in international affairs,34 the scope of that power
has never been defined; nor has the executive power alone been
accepted as a sufficient basis for an exercise of Presidential author-

ity. 35

Two other express grants of power to the President, however,
have been accepted as the source of broad authority in the area of
foreign affairs. The President's power to appoint and receive ambassadors" and to make treaties 37 have established his position as
the voice and ears of the nation." Through the mechanics of the
diplomatic service, the President determines who will speak for the
United States in foreign capitals and which spokesmen of foreign
governments will be listened to in the United States. Inherent in
this power to exchange ambassadors is the power to recognize nations and to determine whether or not diplomatic relations should
be maintained.3 9 Likewise, the power to make treaties implies an
ability to initiate or terminate negotiations with foreign powers. 0
The Senate may advise and must consent to treaties, 41 but only the
President may negotiate." In the words of John Marshall, "The
President is sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
' '43
its sole representative with foreign nations.
This unique position of the President as the conduit through
which pass the communications between the United States and
foreign governments was recognized at an early stage of our history. In 1799 the Congress passed "An Act to Prevent Usurpation
of Executive Functions." 4 Popularly titled the Logan Act, this law
forces is specifically enumerated to clarify his role in light of the congressional
power to declare war. Likewise, the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors are specifically enumerated because of the qualification requiring consent of
the Senate. E. CORWIN, THE PREsmEr: OFFIcE AND PowEm 217-18 (3rd ed. 1948).
34. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
35. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAmS AND THE CONSTrIUTION 43 (1972).
36. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
37. Id.
38. L. HENKIN, supra note 35, at 37.
39. Id. at 41, 47-48.
40. Id. at 41, 48.
41. U.S. CONST. art. IT,§ 2, cl. 2.
42. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
43. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) cited in L. HENKIN, supra note 35, at 45.
See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
44. Logan Act, Ch. 1, 1 Stat. 613 (1799), (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 953
(1976)).
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imposes criminal penalties upon Americans who engage in private
"correspondence or intercourse" with any foreign government in an
attempt to influence its conduct in relation to the United States.
The Congress thus clearly dictated that whatever is communicated
to a foreign government must be communicated by the Executive
under our constitutional framework. The question raised by the
inclusion of foreign governments as "persons" under the FOIA is
whether the congressional directive to the President to communicate information to those persons unconstitutionally interferes
with the presidential control of foreign relations.
IV.

AN

ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONFLICT

An example of the conflict between the disclosure required by
the FOIA and a presidential decision to withhold information in
the interest of foreign affairs can best be illustrated by consideration of a hypothetical fact situation.
The government of Iran wishes to purchase military hardware
from the United States. In the early stages of the negotiations, the
Iranian government asks that the arrangements be kept confidential. The United States Department of Defense (DOD), in accordance with the Arms Export Control Act,4 5 determines the cost of the
hardware from the American manufacturer and offers to procure it
for the Iranian government at the stated price. Iran then accepts the
offered price, agrees to terms of payment, and signs the agreement.
The Department of Defense then contracts for the equipment
through its normal procurement channels. At that point the Letter
of Offer and Acceptance" (LOA) between Iran and the United
States is filed in DOD files.
During the course of the Iranian dealings, the State Department
has been involved in negotiations to improve United States relations
with the government of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government is
concerned about the military build up in Iran, and in exchange for
increased oil guarantees, seeks additional United States military
aid. In an effort to improve its negotiating position, the Saudi government files a FOIA request for copies of the LOA negotiated between the United States and Iran.
For purposes of this example, it will be assumed that the President opposes disclosure of the agreement in the interest of our
foreign relations with Iran as well as to protect our bargaining
45. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2794 (1976).
46. Department of Defense Form 1531. See, 32 C.F.R.

§ 1206. 1303-1 (1978).
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position with Saudi Arabia.
It is clear that the .Saudi Arabian government is a "person"
under the terms of the FOIA47 and therefore is presumptively entitled to disclosure of the agreement. It must therefore be determined whether the Department of Defense may properly deny access to the document under one of the exemption provisions. 8
A. Exemption (b)(4)
Exemption (b) (4)49 protects from disclosure information which is
commercial or financial in nature and privileged or confidential.
In our scenario, the LOA contains financial information which was
accompanied by Iran's request for confidentiality. As the language
of this provision has been interpreted, however, it would not exempt the LOA for two reasons.
First, the express language of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4) exempts this
type of information when it has been submitted to the government
by a "person."5 The government of Iran has already been shown
to fit within the "person" definition.51 Under the provision of the
Arms Export Control Act, however, the financial figures are determined by the United States and presented to the foreign government.-2 The foreign government then accepts the figures by its
signature on the LOA. It is thus difficult to say the figures have
been submitted to the United States Government by the government of Iran. Even if such a determination is made, however, the
information must still meet the test of being "privileged or confi53

dential."

The courts that have interpreted the (b)(4) exemption apply the
two pronged test enunciated in National Parks and Conservation
Ass'n. v. Morton 4 to determine whether information is privileged
or confidential. To be exempt from disclosure under that test,
47.

See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2) (1976).

48. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552 (b)(1)-(b)(9). The Exemptions which concern internal
personnel rules ((b)(2)), inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums ((b)(5)),
files which invade personal privacy ((b)(6)), law enforcement files ((b)(7)), reports on financial institutions ((b)(8)(1), or geological data ((b)(9)) are inapplicable to the requested document and will therefore not be discussed in the text.
49. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4).
50.

Id.

51.
52.
53.
54.

See, note 2 supra and accompanying text.
32 C.F.R. § 1206.1303-1 (1978).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(4).
498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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information must be of a type which, if disclosed, either would
result in competitive harm to the person submitting it," or would
impair the government's ability to obtain similar information in
the future. 6 The financial information contained in the LOA does
not meet either of these criteria. There would be no discernable
harm to the government of Iran resulting from disclosure of its
ability to pay a specified amount for military equipment from the
United States. The purpose of the "competitive" harm standard
is to protect information such as trade secrets that would harm a
person's business position if possessed by a competitor. 57 Likewise,
the United States Government's ability to obtain similar information in the future would not be impaired by disclosure of Iran's
agreement. This test is meant to safeguard information voluntarily
submitted to agencies for the purpose of government studies, legislation, or mediation of labor disputes." Any government wishing
to purchase equipment would be required to agree to terms in order
to purchase the equipment. Since that agreement is a prerequisite
to the purchase, the United States Government will be able to
obtain the information in any future sale.
Iran's request for confidentiality concerning the negotiations and
agreement will not in itself be sufficient to make the agreement
privileged or confidential under the exemption. The court in
National Parks and ConservationAss'n. v. Morton indicated that
a request for confidentiality, even if it is accompanied by an assurance of non-disclosure, will not automatically exempt information
from the requirements of the Act unless non-disclosure would be
justified under the established tests. 9 Therefore, even if the DOD
acceeded to Iran's request for confidentiality, the information
would not be exempt from disclosure.
B. Exemption (b)(3)
Exemption (b)(3)0 directs non-disclosure of requested information if disclosure of that information is prohibited by law. Congress' intent in passing that exemption was to avoid a conflict with
55. Id. at 770.

56. Id.
57. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2427.
58. Id.; See also, National Parks and Conservation Ass'n. v. Morton, 498 F.2d

765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
59. 498 F.2d 765 at 770.
60.

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3) (1976).
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areas in which legislation had already dictated non-disclosure of
specific forms of information in the possession of government agencies. 1 Several attempts have been made in FOIA cases to prevent
disclosure based on 18 U.S.C. § 1905. This general criminal statute
makes it a violation of federal law for a government employee to
improperly disclose business information which comes to him in
the course of his employment. The courts have uniformly held that
provision inapplicable to the (b)(3) exemption to the FOIA because it does not set specific guidelines for withholding information."2
Those holdings are a direct result of Administrator, Federal
Aviation Administration v. Robertson,63 in which the Supreme
Court found that a statute giving broad discretionary withholding
power to the Federal Aviation Administration64 met the test of a
withholding statute under (b) (3). In response to that holding, Congress amended the exemption to require that the statute in question either prohibit disclosure,65 or if it allows discretion, that the
discretion either be exercised within specified guidelines66 or apply
to specific information. 7
Agreements for sale of military hardware by the United States
cannot be withheld solely on the basis of the (b)(3) exemption
because of the Arms Export Control Act. That Act requires that
agreements for arms sales abroad must be as accessible to the
public as possible without jeopardizing national security. 6 Similar
61. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 57, at 2426.
62. See, e.g., Neal-Cooper Grain Company v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769
(1974); Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. General Services Administration, 384 F. Supp.
996 (1974); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. Securities Exchange Commission, 339 F.
Supp. 467 (1972).
63. 422 U.S. 255 (1975).
64. The statute relied upon was the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §1104, 49
U.S.C. § 1504 (1976), which reads in part:
Any person may make written objection to the public disclosure of information ....

Whenever such objection is made, the Board or Administra-

tor shall order such information withheld from public disclosure when, in
their judgment, a disclosure of such information would adversely affect the
interests of such person and is not required in the interest of the public.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3)(A).
66. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3)(B).
67.

Id.

68. Any contracts entered into between the United States and a foreign
country under the authority of this section .

.

. shall be prepared in a

manner which will permit them to be made available for public inspection
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provisions have been held to mandate disclosure of information
rather than to authorize non-disclosure. 9 It, therefore, could not
be relied upon to exempt the disclosure of the requested LOA.
Presumably, the national security consideratons that would warrant non-disclosure under the Arms Export Control Act would
mandate that a security classification be assigned to the agreement to protect its contents in the interest of national security.
C.

Exemption (b)(1)

Exemption (b)(1)70 permits non-disclosure of requested information when secrecy is required in the interest of defense or foreign
relations and when the information has been "properly classified"
pursuant to an executive order. The requirement for "proper" classification is another Congressional reaction to a court holding allowing non-disclosure of documents. Prior to 1974 the exemption
protected documents which were classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. 7' In Environmental Protection

Agency v. Mink, 72 thirty-two members of Congress requested disclosure by the EPA of documents relating to a proposed underground nuclear test. The agency denied access to the records on the
grounds they were classified documents and thus exempt from
disclosure. The District Court upheld the agency claim, but the
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lower court should
have examined the documents in camera to determine whether
they contained any unclassfied information which should properly
be disclosed. 73 In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme
Court stated that the classification of the documents in and of
itself was sufficient to prevent disclosure. 7 Once the District Court
determined that the documents carried a security classification, its
inquiry was at an end. The Court reasoned that Congress was
aware of the President's classification order at the time it passed
the Act and therefore since Congress had not dictated new classification criteria, it had accepted the provisions of the Executive
to the fullest extent possible consistent with the national security of the
United States.
22 U.S.C. § 2761(f) (1976).
69. Schechter v. Weinberger, 506 F.2d 1275 (1974).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1) (1976).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1) (1976).

72. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
73.
74.

Mink v. Environmental Protection Agency, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973).
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Order that were incorporated into the Act. The Court stated:
"[T]he legislative history disposes of any possible argument that
Congress intended the Freedom of Information Act to subject executive security classifications to judicial review at the insistence of
anyone who might seek to question them.

'75 The

Court went on to

indicate that Congress could have dictated new procedures or
adopted its own procedures, subject to the limitations of the Exec7

utive privilege.

1

In response to this decision, 77 Congress amended the (b)(1) exemption in 1974 to require that documents withheld pursuant to
its provisions be authorized classification pursuant to the criteria
of the Executive Order and that they be in fact properly classified.
With this amendment, Congress gave the courts the duty, as well
as the right, to determine whether documents are properly classified. 78 Judges are thus authorized to examine the documents and
make their own independent determination on the need for secrecy
in the interest of national security.
As this exemption is applied to the hypothetical fact situation
under consideration, several problems are encountered. First, it is
doubtful whether the LOA requested by Saudi Arabia will be classified at the time of the request. Because the Arms Export and
Control Act requires agreements to sell arms to be made publicly
accessible if possible,79 the LOA itself is likely to contain little
other than listings of types of equipment, quantity, and cost. Any
specifics of a militarily sensitive nature are likely to be incorporated by reference to classified material.
At this point, the question arises whether the agreement, which
was unclassified when it was signed, may be assigned a security
classification subsequent to, and because of, a FOIA request for its
disclosure. The current classification order, Executive Order
12065,80 provides that such action is permissible if strict procedural
requirements are met. Any document which is the subject of a
FOIA request may be classified subsequent to that request only by
an agency head or deputy agency head.8 1In addition to the proce75.
76.

Id. at 82.
Id. at 83.
77. H.R. REP. No. 876, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD.NEWS 6267, 6272-73.

78.
79.
80.
81.

CrrLzEN's GUIDE, supra note 23 at 10.
22 U.S.C. § 2761 (f).
Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (1978).
Id. at § 1-606.
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dural requirements, the substantive requirements necessary to
authorize classification also must be met."2
The substantive requirements of Executive Order 12065 provide
that information which concerns the foreign relations of the United
States may properly be considered for classification. Three possible designations for classification are then available to the agency.
A "top secret" classification may be applied only if disclosure of
the information "reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security."8 The "secret" designation may be applied to information whose disclosure
"reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security."85 The final classification, "Confidential," may be
applied to information that "reasonably could be expected to cause
identifiable damage to the national security" if disclosed. 8 The
order also provides that in cases of doubt about the appropriate
classification, or whether in fact classification is proper, "the less
restrictive classification should be used, or the information should
' 87
not be classified.
These provisions of the order, which became effective December
1, 1978, have not yet been applied by the courts in a FOIA case.
The interpretations given to the provisions of the previous classification order, Executive Order 11652,88 do, however, give some indication of the judicial treatment to be expected under the current
order. In Halperin v. Department of State,89 the Court of Appeals
strictly interpreted the substantive requirements for classification
and found that the document had not been "properly classified"
pursuant to the executive order.
Halperin dealt with a reporter's request for a transcript of a
"background press conference" 0 held by the Secretary of State.
That document had been unclassified from the time of its origin
82. Id.
83. Id. at § 1-301(d).
84. Id. at § 1-102.
85. Id. at § 1-103.
86. Id. at § 1-104.
87. Id. at § 1-101.
88. 3A C.F.R. 154 (1972), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
89. 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
90. The background press conference is used by the State Department to
disseminate information without the risk of direct attribution of sensitive statements to government sources. The rules governing these conferences require that
only paraphrase be used in reporting the information which may be attributed
only to unnamed "Senior State Department officials." Id. at 701.
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until the request for its disclosure. Upon review of the document
pursuant to the FOIA request, a department official noted that
certain comments concerning a pending arms limitation agreement, while not themselves strictly classified, could be harmful to
foreign relations if attributed to the Secretary. Due to these concerns, portions of the transcript were assigned a security classification and withheld from the requesting party.
The Court held that the agency's classification was improper
both procedurally and substantively. The court found that subsequent classification was not procedurally allowed because Executive Order 11652 required a classification to be assigned to a document at the time it originated." Nevertheless, the court proceeded
to analyze whether the agency action complied with the substantive terms of the order. The deposition of the agency official who
assigned the classification indicated he had taken the action because he felt disclosure "would be prejudicial to national interests. 92 The court compared this rationale to the terms of the order,
which authorized classification of information if its disclosure
"could reasonably be expected to cause damage" to national security,93 and found that the standard used did not comply with the
language of the directive and was therefore improper.
Executive Order 1206511 seems to have solved the procedural
problem of Halperin v. Department of State" by specifically authorizing classification subsequent to a FOIA request for disclosure.98 The problems with substance, however, still exist. Assuming for purposes of the hypothetical fact situation that the Executive's perceived harm to national security is neither "exceptionally
grave"9 7 nor "serious,"" the agency is limited to a choice of either
classifying the document "Confidential," or imposing no classification. In light of the directive to use the least restrictive classification in cases of doubt,9 9 it could be argued that any classification
in this case would be substantively improper. Even if the classifying authority has no doubt about the propriety of the classification,
91.
92.

Id. at 704.
Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.

Exec. Order No. 11,652, supra note 88, at § I(C).
43 Fed. Reg. 28949 (1978).
565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 80.

97.
98.
99.

See note 84 supra.
See note 85 supra.
See note 87 supra.
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the criteria for imposing a "Confidential" classification pose problems. The requirement that the harm resulting from disclosure of
the information be "identifiable"""0 is seemingly more strict than
that of Executive Order 11625. A court that interprets that provision as strictly as the Halperin court could conceivably require a
specific demonstration of harm which the executive branch would
be unable to provide. In that case, the classification would be
improper under exemption (b) (1) and disclosure of the LOA would
be required despite Presidential opposition.
V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The key to determining the constitutionality of the FOLA as it
applies to foreign nationals and agencies of foreign governments
lies in a distinction between dissemination of information and creation of policy. Assuming, arguendo, that Congress has the constitutional authority to direct disclosure of information, the FOLA, on
its face, is constitutional. When, however, the disclosure directed
by Congress acts to restrict the President's power to make a foreign
policy decision, as it does in the proposed hypothetical, it must be
interpreted to be unconstitutional as applied.
A.

Interference with the Classification Decision

The Supreme Court stated in Mink'"' that Congress did not have
to accept the existing executive classification criteria for FOLA
purposes. The court, however, also indicated that whatever system
Congress established must give due regard to the privilege of the
President. When Congress amended the first FOLA exemption in
response to that decision, it neither established its own criteria nor
amended the President's. Rather, Congress inserted the courts into
the classification process in direct disregard of the principle of
separation of powers and without the deference to executive decisions encouraged by Mink.
In 1936, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.'0 2 emphasized the "very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power"'0 3 of the President in foreign affairs.
Subsequent decisions in the area of foreign relations have indicated that the courts continue to show deference to executive deci100. See note 86 supra.
101. E.P.A. v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
102. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
103.

Id. at 320.
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sions made in the exercise of that power. The Court dealt with the
issue again in Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
Steamship Corp., "I when it considered a Civil Aeronautics Board
award of an overseas air route. The Board's proposed order had
been reviewed by the President who had directed changes be made
in the interest of the "national welfare."''

5

Refusing to exercise

judicial review of that portion of the order which resulted from the
President's directive, the court stated:
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's
organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose
reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would
be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should
review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order
to be taken into executive confidences .

. .

. [T]he very nature of

executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial
... . They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry. '
Five years later, in United States v. Reynolds, ,07 the court again
refused to look into the background of a presidential decision to
withhold information because of foreign affairs considerations.
Reynolds involved a demand for evidence made by a claimant
suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' °8 The
demand was refused on the basis of a claim of executive privilege
in the interest of foreign affairs. In upholding the Executive's
claim, the court noted the impropriety of judicial second guessing
of foreign affairs decisions.' 9
Two decisions by the Supreme Court in recent years have resulted in holdings that have given less than automatic deference
to Executive claims of privilege, but neither has restricted the
broad foreign affairs language of Waterman"O and Reynolds."'
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

333 U.S. 103 (1948).
Id. at 111.
Id.
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
333 U.S. 103 (1948).
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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New York Times Company v. United States"' dealt with a question of prior restraints on the first amendment rights of citizens.
The government sought to prevent publication of "The Pentagon
Papers" because of the alleged detrimental effect publication
would have on national security and foreign relations. The government's application for a preliminary injunction was denied on the
ground that the "heavy burden" required to justify a prior restraint of first amendment rights had not been met." 3 This holding
was not the result of decreased judicial deference to foreign affairs
decisions, but rather was a result of the increased weight given the
opposing position of a citizen's exercise of a constitutional right.
New York Times is in accord with previous decisions giving priority to constitutionally guaranteed individual rights over foreign
affairs considerations."' This countervailing interest is not present
in a FOIA case involving a foreign national's exercise of a statutorily created right.
The second decision, United States v. Nixon, 5 denied a broad
assertion of executive privilege to withhold documents requested
for a criminal prosecution. While denying the blanket privilege
asserted by the President, the court noted that the claim was not
based on an asserted need to protect military or diplomatic secrets.
Chief Justice Burger indicated that greater deference would be
called for"' if such a claim were made, and cited with approval the
language of Waterman"7 and Reynolds"8 as authority for that
proposition.
As this history of judicial decisions clearly shows, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the constitution has taken the courts out
of the decision making process in the area of foreign affairs. The
court has recognized that certain political decisions, so long as they
do not impinge upon the constitutional rights of citizens, are beyond the competence of the courts. As the majority indicated in
Sabbatino" this recognition has constitutional underpinnings and
is developed from an analysis of the role of each branch of the
112.
113.
114.
Covert,
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Id. at 714.
See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Reid v.
354 U.S. 1 (1957); Faruki v. Rogers, 349 F. Supp. 723 (D.D.C. 1972).
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 710.
Chicago and Southern Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp. supra note 106.
345 U.S. 1 (1953).
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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Federal Government within the constitutional framework. The
courts feel free to enter the realm of foreign affairs by applying the
policy formulated in the political branches to determine the rights
and duties of litigants resulting from that policy. 20 They do not

properly question the wisdom or correctness of the policy itself.
By directing the court to examine classified documents in
camera to determine the propriety of an executive decision to withhold information from a foreign government, the FOIA attempts
to place the court in a role which it is not constitutionally allocated. Procedures by which the propriety of classification may be
questioned are established in Executive Order 12065.1 ' When these
procedures are utilized and the Executive determines that classification is proper in the interest of national security, he or she has
made a foreign policy decision. Requiring, or even allowing a court
to question that decision is beyond the power of Congress.
B. Adverse Precedent
In addition to the questionable constitutionality of injecting the
courts into the process of determining foreign policy, the FOIA
raises a second constitutional issue by the mere fact that it requires
the President to transmit information, regardless of how innocuous
it may be, to a foreign government. The constitution created a
system in which the foreign relations of the United States are
governed by the the concurrent powers of the Executive and Legislative branches.'22 Under that system, as one commentator has
written, "The Framers expected the branches to battle each other
to acquire and to defend power. To prevent the supremacy of one
branch over any other in these battles, . . . ; each branch was

granted important powers over the same area of activity."', 3

120. [O]nce sovereignty over an area is politically determined and declared, courts may examine the resulting status and decide independently
whether a statute applies to that area. Similarly, recognition of belligerency
abroad is an executive responsibility, but if the executive proclamations fall
short of an explicit answer, a court may construe them seeking . . . to
determine whether the situation is such that statutes designed to assure
American neutrality have become operative. . . .Still again, though it is
the executive that determines a person's status as representative of a foreign government, . . . , the executive's statements will be construed where
necessary to determine the courts jurisdiction). . ..
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 212-13 (1962).
121. Exec. Order No. 12,065, supra note 80, at § 3-5.
122. See L. HENKIN, supra note 35, at 104-05.
123. A. SOFAER, supra note 33, at 60.
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In this "battle" for supremacy, the role of historical precedent
is paramount. Presidents seeking to exercise power and legislators
seeking to limit that power and assert a superior congressional role
rely on the precedents of the past to justify their positions.' 4 This
"common law" interpretation of constitutional power prevails
until the Supreme Court makes a determination on the proper
allocation of power in its role as the ultimate interpreter of the
constitution.' = From that point on, judicial interpretation rather
than precedent determines the superior position. The problem presented by the FOIA in this respect is that it presents the danger
of reinserting precedent in the area of communications with foreign
governments.
6
The statements of the Supreme Court in Curtiss-Wright,
Waterman,2 and Sabbatino,'2 all indicated that the court interpreted the constitution to place the conduct of negotiations with
foreign nations in the hands of the Executive. Congress itself supported this position by passage of the Logan Act.129 In the FOIA,
however, Congress has dictated the transmission of information to
foreign governments on a continuing basis. While transmission of
information is arguably different from directing negotiations, by
setting a precedent that enables Congress to direct communication
with foreign governments the FOIA encourages a constitutional
conflict. The decisions of federal courts directing disclosures of
information in conformance with the FOIA, in the future, could,
be relied upon to support a Congressional mandate to the President to transmit a Sense of the Congress Resolution to a foreign
power. If, as the Supreme Court has stated, the Constitution entrusts the conduct of foreign relations to the President, then interpreting the FOIA to mandate such communication with foreign
governments unconstitutionally interferes with that Executive
power.
VI.

THE SOLUTION

The first step toward resolution of the conflict created by the
FOIA would be to specifically exclude foreign nationals and agensupra note 35 at 89-92.

124.

See L.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) 117 (1803).
See text accompanying note 103 supra.
See text accompanying note 106 supra.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra note 119.
18 U.S.C. § 953 (1976).

HENKIN,
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cies of foreign governments from the provisions of the Act. Because
the definition currently in use is applicable to the entire Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ' a total exclusion of foreign nationals from
the meaning of the term "person" would be inappropriate. That
action would deprive foreign nationals of protections currently extended by the application of standardized administrative procedures. The better choice would be to amend the FOIA section of
the APA to include a provision that, for purposes of this section,
the term "person" does not include foreign nationals or agencies
of foreign governments.
An alternative method of resolution would be to replace the term
"person" with the term "individual" as Congress did when it enacted the Privacy Act.' 3' As "individual" is currently defined, the
term includes only United States Citizens and aliens admitted for
permanent residence. 3 2 Use of this term would avoid the problem
of granting access to foreign entities, but it would not adequately
serve the intent of Congress. The FOIA as currently applied extends its benefits to partnerships, corporations, associations, and
public or private organizations other than agencies, as well as to
"individuals."' The legitimate needs of these entities for access
to information should continue to be met through the FOIA. For
that reason, a specific exclusion of foreign entities from the meaning of the term "person," only as it applies to the FOIA, seems the
better choice.
Unfortunately, mere definitional exclusion of foreign entities
from the FOIA terms will not solve the foreign affairs problem of
disclosing official information to foreign governments. The Act
currently places no restrictions on the use or dissemination of information obtained by a requesting "person." Such limitations, of
course, would be inconsistent with the policy of making information publicly available. Due to this lack of limitations, however, a
foreign government, finding itself cut off from direct access to information through the FOIA, could still obtain the information
through the use of a United States intermediary.
Current United States law does not contain any prohibition
against the transmission of unclassified information by a citizen to
a foreign government. Criminal sanctions governing classified doc130.
131.
132.
133.

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976).
Privacy Act of 1974, § 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
Id. at § 552a (a)(2).
See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (1976).
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uments are not applicable to publicly available information.'34 As
3 5 points out, however, even information
Halperin'
which is not confidential may adversely affect foreign relations if it is officially
attributed to or obtained from the United States government. Public writings or commentary attributing a comment or position to
an official government source may be explained away or ignored
in official negotiations. But official government documents asserting the same position may disrupt the course of those negotiations.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938136 originally contained a provision which would have assisted in a resolution of this
problem. That Act required any person acting within the United
States as an agent, servant, or attorney of a foreign principal to
register with the Attorney General as a foreign agent.13 Application of this law in the context of the FOIA would have given the
government notice that an individual was requesting information
on behalf of a foreign government. A 1966 amendment to the Foreign Agents Registration Act restricted the scope of its application.' As "agent" is now defined under the Act, an individual
must carry out specific functions aimed at advancing the political
position of his principal within the U.S. before that individual is
required to register as a foreign agent.' One who acted merely to
obtain information on behalf of a foreign government would not be
required to register as an agent of a foreign principal.
In order to further insure the safeguarding of the Executive's role
in foreign affairs, a provision similar to the agency test of the
original Foreign Agents Registration Act should be included in the
FOIA. Persons requesting information on behalf of foreign entities
should be required to indicate that fact in their requests. This
would enable executive branch officials to examine the possible
foreign affairs implications of disclosure. Such a provision should
also grant complete executive discretion in deciding whether disclosure will be made.
In the final analysis, however, the courts must take the necessary steps to preserve the constitutional role of the Executive in
foreign affairs and to prevent future conflict. The first step in this
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1976).
135. Halperin v. Department of State, 565 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
136. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611 et seq. (1976).
137. Id. at § 612(a).
138. An Act to amend the Foreign Agent's Registration Act of 1938, as
amended, § 1, Pub. L. No. 89-486, 80 Stat. 244 (1966).
139. 22 U.S.C. § 611(c) (1976).
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process is for the courts to follow the lead of the Supreme Court in
Mink 40 by-refusing to delve into the motives of the Executive in
classifying information or making foreign policy decisions. Failure
to do otherwise could lead to a constitutional conflict of far greater
impact than the current problems. Fortunately, the cases to date
that have included foreign entities as "persons" under the FOIA
have presented situations in which the position of the Executive
regarding disclosure has concurred with that of the foreign government. A case in which the court interprets the FOIA to support the
foreign government's position, however, could force the Executive
into a position in which his interpretation of his constitutional role
would force him to refuse to abide by the court's decision. The
constitutional implications of that possibility should far outweigh
any interest even the Congress might have in ensuring the accessibility of information to foreign governments.
Lloyd F. LeRoy
140.

Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

